


Computer security
Asymmetric encryption

Olivier Markowitch

Public key encryption

A public key cryptosystem uses the public key of the recipient to encrypt the plaintext and the recipient used its private key to decrypt the ciphertext



Time complexity function	Size n					
	10	20	30	40	50	60
n	.00001 second	.00002 second	.00003 second	.00004 second	.00005 second	.00006 second
n^2	.0001 second	.0004 second	.0009 second	.0016 second	.0025 second	.0036 second
n^3	.001 second	.008 second	.027 second	.064 second	.125 second	.216 second
n^5	.1 second	3.2 seconds	24.3 seconds	1.7 minutes	5.2 minutes	13.0 minutes
2^n	.001 second	1.0 second	17.9 minutes	12.7 days	35.7 years	366 centuries
3^n	.059 second	58 minutes	6.5 years	3855 centuries	2×10^8 centuries	1.3×10^{13} centuries

Figure 1.2 Comparison of several polynomial and exponential time complexity functions.

Theorems

1. $\forall n \geq 2 : n = p_1^{e_1} \dots p_r^{e_r}$ where, for $i \in [1, r]$, the p_i are primes and $e_i \geq 0$ are integers
2. If $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ are not simultaneously equal to zero, there exist $u, v \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $au + bv = (a, b)$ where (a, b) denotes the gcd between a and b (Bézout)
3. $ax \equiv 1 \pmod{m} \Leftrightarrow (a, m) = 1$

4. If m is prime and $(a, m) = 1$: $a^{m-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{m}$
(Fermat)

5. Euler Phi function: we note $\Phi(n)$ the number of integers smaller than n and that are prime with n .
$$\Phi(n) = n \cdot \prod_{i=1}^r \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_i}\right)$$

6. multiplicative group:

$$\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{a \in \mathbb{Z}_n \text{ such that } (a, n) = 1\}$$

7. We consider a group composed by $\phi(n)$ elements ($n > 2$), for an element a of this group we have $a^{\phi(n)} = 1$

8. We consider a group composed by $\phi(n)$ elements ($n > 2$), for an element a of this group we have that the order of a divides the order of the group

Example 1

$$n = 7, \mathbb{Z}_7^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}, \phi(7) = 6$$

$$\text{order of } 1 = 1 : 1^0 = 1, 1^1 = 1$$

$$\text{order of } 2 = 3 : 2^0 = 1, 2^1 = 2, 2^2 = 4, 2^3 = 1$$

$$\text{order of } 3 = 6 \text{ (generator)} : 3^0 = 1, 3^1 = 3, 3^2 = 2, 3^3 = 6, 3^4 = 4, 3^5 = 5, 3^6 = 1$$

$$\text{order of } 4 = 3 : 4^0 = 1, 4^1 = 4, 4^2 = 2, 4^3 = 1$$

$$\text{order of } 5 = 6 \text{ (generator)} : 5^0 = 1, 5^1 = 5, 5^2 = 4, 5^3 = 6, 5^4 = 2, 5^5 = 3, 5^6 = 1$$

$$\text{order of } 6 = 2 : 6^0 = 1, 6^1 = 6, 6^2 = 1$$

Example 2

$$n = 9, \mathbb{Z}_9^* = \{1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8\}, \phi(9) = 6$$

$$\text{order of } 1 = 1 : 1^0 = 1, 1^1 = 1$$

$$\text{order of } 2 = 6 \text{ (generator)} : 2^0 = 1, 2^1 = 2, 2^2 = 4, 2^3 = 8, 2^4 = 7, 2^5 = 5, 2^6 = 1$$

$$\text{order of } 4 = 3 : 4^0 = 1, 4^1 = 4, 4^2 = 7, 4^3 = 1$$

$$\text{order of } 5 = 6 \text{ (generator)} : 5^0 = 1, 5^1 = 5, 5^2 = 7, 5^3 = 8, 5^4 = 4, 5^5 = 2, 5^6 = 1$$

$$\text{order of } 7 = 3 : 7^0 = 1, 7^1 = 7, 7^2 = 4, 7^3 = 1$$

$$\text{order of } 8 = 2 : 8^0 = 1, 8^1 = 8, 8^2 = 1$$

Chinese remainder theorem

Si $\forall 1 \leq i \neq j \leq k : (m_i, m_j) = 1$:

$$\begin{cases} x \equiv a_1 \pmod{m_1} \\ \vdots \\ x \equiv a_k \pmod{m_k} \end{cases}$$

has one and only one solution modulo $m = m_1 \dots m_k$

Chinese remainder theorem

The solution is unique

since $x \equiv a_i \pmod{m_i}$ and $y \equiv a_i \pmod{m_i} \forall i \in [1, k]$:

$$x \equiv y \pmod{m_i} \forall i \in [1, k],$$

$$m_i \text{ divides } x - y \forall i \in [1, k],$$

$$m \text{ divides } x - y,$$

$$x \equiv y \pmod{m}$$

Chinese remainder theorem

The solution exists

Let $M_i = \frac{m}{m_i} \forall i \in [1, k]$,

m_i is prime with all m_j (when $i \neq j$),

then m_i is prime with M_i

therefore, it exists an integer c_i such that $c_i M_i \equiv 1 \pmod{m_i}$

Let $x = \sum_{i=1}^k a_i c_i M_i$,

We have $x \pmod{m_i} = a_i c_i M_i \pmod{m_i} = a_i$

Indeed, $M_j \equiv 0 \pmod{m_i}$ when $i \neq j$ and $c_i M_i \equiv 1 \pmod{m_i}$

x is a solution of the system

Square roots of 1

$n = pq$ where p et q are two primes, it exists four square roots of 1 modulo n

These four square roots are computed from two square roots of 1 modulo p (1 and -1) and two square roots of 1 modulo q (1 and -1) that are combined using the chinese remainder theorem

Square roots of 1

Let $p = 7$, $q = 3$ ($n = 21$), we are looking for a x such that $x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. The system of four equations is:

$$(1) x \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \text{ et } x \equiv 1 \pmod{q};$$

$$(2) x \equiv -1 \pmod{p} \text{ et } x \equiv 1 \pmod{q};$$

$$(3) x \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \text{ et } x \equiv -1 \pmod{q};$$

$$(4) x \equiv -1 \pmod{p} \text{ et } x \equiv -1 \pmod{q}$$

we solve them using the chinese remainder theorem where $m_1 = p$, $m_2 = q$, $M_1 = \frac{pq}{p} = q$, $M_2 = \frac{pq}{q} = p$, $C_1 = M_1^{-1} \pmod{m_1} = 5$ et $C_2 = M_2^{-1} \pmod{m_2} = 1$

$$(1) x = a_1 C_1 M_1 + a_2 C_2 M_2 = 1 \cdot 3 \cdot 5 + 1 \cdot 7 \cdot 1 = 1 \pmod{21}$$

$$(2) x = a_1 C_1 M_1 + a_2 C_2 M_2 = (-1) \cdot 3 \cdot 5 + 1 \cdot 7 \cdot 1 = 8 \pmod{21}$$

$$(3) x = a_1 C_1 M_1 + a_2 C_2 M_2 = 1 \cdot 3 \cdot 5 + (-1) \cdot 7 \cdot 1 = -8 \pmod{21}$$

$$(4) x = a_1 C_1 M_1 + a_2 C_2 M_2 = (-1) \cdot 3 \cdot 5 + (-1) \cdot 7 \cdot 1 = -1 \pmod{21}$$

Quadratic residues

$a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ is a quadratic residue modulo n , if it exists $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ such that $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{n}$. If such a x doesn't exist a is said to be a non quadratic residue modulo n

The set of all the quadratic residues modulo n is noted Q_n . The set of all the non quadratic residues modulo n is noted \bar{Q}_n

$\frac{p-1}{2}$ elements of \mathbb{Z}_p^* are squares modulo p and $\frac{p-1}{2}$ elements of \mathbb{Z}_p^* are not squares (where p is an odd prime)

Legendre symbol



Adrien-Marie Legendre

If p is an odd prime and a is an integer, then the Legendre symbol:

$$\left(\frac{a}{p}\right) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{si } p \text{ divide } a \\ 1 & \text{si } a \in Q_p \\ -1 & \text{si } a \in \bar{Q}_p \end{cases}$$

Moreover: $\left(\frac{a}{p}\right) = a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \pmod{p}$

Legendre symbol

Proof :

If p divides a , it exists k such that $a = kp$ and $a \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$; therefore $a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$

if $a \in Q_p$, it exists $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{p}$, therefore

$$a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv x^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \text{ (Fermat)}$$

Legendre symbol

If $a \in \bar{Q}_p$, we have (when p is prime) $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ (Fermat). Then $a^{p-1} - 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ and

$$\left(a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} - 1\right) \left(a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} + 1\right) \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

Since $a \in \bar{Q}_p$ we haven't $a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} - 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ (otherwise a would be in Q_p)

Therefore we have $a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$, and $a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv -1 \pmod{p}$ if $a \in \bar{Q}_p$

Jacobi Symbol



Charles Gustave Jacob Jacobi

Let a be an integer and n an odd integer ≥ 3 such that $n = p_1^{e_1} \dots p_r^{e_r}$:

$$\left(\frac{a}{n}\right) = \left(\frac{a}{p_1}\right)^{e_1} \dots \left(\frac{a}{p_r}\right)^{e_r}$$

Theorem

1. $a \in Q_n \Leftrightarrow a \in Q_p \text{ et } a \in Q_q$ (where $n = pq$ and p, q are distinct primes)
2. If $a \in Q_p$ and $a \in \bar{Q}_q$, then $\left(\frac{a}{n}\right) = \left(\frac{a}{p}\right) \left(\frac{a}{q}\right) = 1 \cdot -1 = -1$
3. Idem, if $a \in \bar{Q}_p$ and $a \in Q_q$

4. if $a \in Q_p$ and $a \in Q_q$ then $\left(\frac{a}{n}\right) = \left(\frac{a}{p}\right) \left(\frac{a}{q}\right) = 1 \cdot 1 = 1$

5. But if $a \in \bar{Q}_p$ and $a \in \bar{Q}_q$ then we have $\left(\frac{a}{n}\right) = \left(\frac{a}{p}\right) \left(\frac{a}{q}\right) = -1 \cdot -1 = 1$

6. Therefore $\left(\frac{a}{n}\right) = 1$ does not allow to know whether $a \in Q_n$ or $a \in \bar{Q}_n$

Factorization

Having a positive integer n , we have to find its prime factors:



$$n = p_1^{e_1} \cdots p_n^{e_n}$$

where p_i are distinct and $e_i \geq 1$

Existing methods:

- ρ -Pollard
- $p - 1$ -Pollard
- Crible quadratique
- Number field sieve

RSA



Ronald Rivest - Adi Shamir - Leonard Adleman

RSA

Keys generation

1. choose randomly two large distinct primes p and q approximately of the same size
2. compute $n = pq$ and $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$
3. choose randomly an integer $e \in]1, \phi(n)[$ such that $(e, \phi(n)) = 1$
4. compute the unique $d \in]1, \phi(n)[$ such that $e \cdot d \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$

The public key is (n, e)

The private key is d

RSA

Encryption

Let $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ the message to encrypt. We compute:

$$y = x^e \mod n$$

Decryption

y is decrypted by computing:

$$x = y^d \mod n$$

RSA: keys usage

Knowing the public key (e, n) and the corresponding private key d , n can be factorized

Proof: we have $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$

For every integer $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ we have $a^{ed-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$

We can write: $ed - 1 = 2^s t$ with t an odd integer
($a^{2^s t} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$)

If $z = a^{2^{s-1}t}$ is a trivial square root of 1 modulo n we choose another integer a

Otherwise (z being a non-trivial square root of 1 modulo n) we have $z^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ and n divides $z^2 - 1$, therefore n divides $(z - 1)(z + 1)$

RSA: keys usage

What are the values of $(z - 1, n)$ and $(z + 1, n)$?

These two gcd's can have only the following values:
 $1, p, q$ or n

Neither can be equal to n , because if $(z - 1, n) = n$ then $z - 1$ is a multiple of n , and $z \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ and z is a trivial square root of 1. The same reasoning is valid if $(z + 1, n) = n$

These two gcd's cannot be simultaneously equal to 1, because if $(z - 1, n) = 1$ and $(z + 1, n) = 1$ then n does not divide $z^2 - 1$

Conclusion: at least one of these two gcd's is equal to p or q

Corollary: two RSA users cannot have the same n in their public key

RSA: cyclic attack

Alice sends to Bob a ciphertext y encrypted with his RSA public key (e_B, n_B)

Oscar observes y (on the communication channel) and knows that Bob is the recipient; Oscar can encrypt again the ciphertext with the public key of Bob until he obtains a cycle:

$$y^{e_B} \bmod n_B$$
$$(y^{e_B})^{e_B} \bmod n_B = y^{e_B^2} \bmod n_B$$

$$\dots$$
$$(y^{e_B^{i-2}})^{e_B} \bmod n_B = y^{e_B^{i-1}} \bmod n_B$$
$$(y^{e_B^{i-1}})^{e_B} \bmod n_B = y^{e_B^i} \bmod n_B$$

$$\text{until } y^{e_B^i} \bmod n_B = y$$

$$\text{then Oscar retrieves } x = y^{e_B^{i-1}} \bmod n_B$$


Square root problem

On the basis of n where $n = pq$ and p, q are primes, and having a a quadratic residue modulo n , find a square root of a modulo n

If p and q are known, it exists a solution that has a polynomial complexity

The square root problem is computationally equivalent to the factorization problem

Rabin



Michael Rabin

Rabin

Keys generation

choose randomly two large distinct primes p and q approximately of the same size and compute $n = pq$

The public key is n

The private key is (p, q)

Encryption

Let $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ the message to encrypt. We compute:

$$y = x^2 \mod n$$

Decryption

Compute the four square roots modulo n of y and choose (possibly on the basis of a redundancy) the square root that corresponds to the plaintext

Computation of the four square roots

Suppose $n = pq$ and $p \equiv q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$

- find the integers a and b such that $ap + bq = 1$ (Bezout)
- computer $r = y^{\frac{p+1}{4}} \pmod{p}$
- computer $s = y^{\frac{q+1}{4}} \pmod{q}$
- computer $g = aps + bqr \pmod{n}$
- computer $h = aps + bq(-r) \pmod{n}$

The four square roots of y modulo n are g , $-g$, h et $-h$

Rabin: chosen cipher text attack

Suppose that Oscar can access a decryption device that decrypt all messages encrypted for Bob

Oscar chooses randomly $x \in Z_n$ and encrypts x for Bob: $y = x^2 \bmod n$. Then, he submits y to the decryption device and obtains, as output, x' (one of the four square roots of y)

With a probability $\frac{1}{2}$, this square root is different from x and $-x$ (otherwise Oscar restarts the process)

We have:

$$x \text{ de la forme } aps + bqr$$

$$x' \text{ de la forme } aps + bq(-r)$$

Oscar computes:

$$(x - x', n) = (2bqr, pq) = q$$

Rabin: example

Let $p = 277$, $q = 331$

$$n = p \cdot q = 91687$$

Bob's public key: $n = 91687$

Bob's private key: $(p, q) = (227, 331)$

Alice wants to send the message x to Bob:

$$x_0 = 1001111001$$

She adds a redundancy (duplication of the six last bits):

$$x = x_0111001 = 1001111001111001 = 40569$$

She computes:

$$y = x^2 \bmod n = 40569^2 \bmod 91687 = 62111$$

Rabin: example

To decrypt the ciphertext y , Bob computes the square roots of y modulo n (Bob knows p and q):

$$\sqrt{y} \bmod n =$$

$$\begin{cases} x_1 = 69654 = 100010000000010110 \\ x_2 = 22033 = 101011000010001 \\ x_3 = 40569 = 1001111001111001 \\ x_4 = 51118 = 1100011110101110 \end{cases}$$

Only x_3 has the correct redundancy therefore $x_0 = 1001111001$

Discrete logarithm problem

Suppose a prime p , a generator $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and $\beta \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$;
find x , $0 \leq x \leq n - 1$ such that $\alpha^x = \beta$

Existing methods:

- baby step, giant step
- ρ -Pollard for logarithms
- Pohlig-Hellman
- Index calculus

El Gamal



Taher El Gamal

El Gamal

Keys generation

1. choose randomly a large prime p
2. find a generator α of the multiplicative group \mathbb{Z}_p^*
3. choose randomly an integer $a \in [1, p - 2]$
4. compute $\beta = \alpha^a \mod p$

The public key is (p, α, β)

The private key is a

El Gamal

Encryption

To encrypt $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, choose randomly an integer $k \in [1, p - 2]$ and compute:

$$\begin{cases} y_1 = \alpha^k \mod p \\ y_2 = x \cdot \beta^k \mod p \end{cases}$$

Decryption

Let (y_1, y_2) be the ciphertext:

$$x = y_1^{-a} \cdot y_2 \mod p$$

Quadratic residuosity problem

Suppose an odd non prime integer n and $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ such that $\left(\frac{a}{n}\right) = 1$, is a a quadratic residue modulo n ?

The quadratic residuosity problem \leq_P the factorization problem

Goldwasser-Micali



Shafi Goldwasser - Silvio Micali

Goldwasser-Micali

Keys generation

1. choose randomly two large distinct primes p and q approximately of the same size
2. compute $n = pq$
3. choose $z \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ such that z is a non-quadratic residue modulo n and such that $\left(\frac{z}{n}\right) = -1$

The public key is (n, z)

The private key is (p, q)

Goldwasser-Micali

Encryption

Let x be composed by t bits: $x_1 \dots x_t$

1. choose randomly $\forall i \in [1, t]: r_i$
2. $\forall i \in [1, t] : y_i = z^{x_i} \cdot r_i^2 \pmod n$

Decryption

$\forall i \in [1, t]$, compute $\left(\frac{y_i}{p}\right) = e_i$

If $e_i = 1$ then $x_i = 0$, otherwise $x_i = 1$

Remark : y_i is a quadratic residue modulo n ($n = pq$)
if y_i is a quadratic residue modulo p

Goldwasser-Micali

Let $p = 7$, $q = 3$ and therefore $n = 21$ be the private and public information of Bob

We look for a $z \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ that is a non-quadratic residue modulo n and such that $\left(\frac{z}{n}\right) = 1$

The quadratic residue modulo 21 are:
 $\{1, 4, 7, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18\}$

Let's try $z = 11$ and compute $\left(\frac{11}{21}\right) = \left(\frac{11}{3}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{11}{7}\right)$
 $= (11^1 \bmod 3) \cdot (11^3 \bmod 7) = -1 \cdot 1 = -1$.
Therefore $z = 11$ is not appropriate

Let's try $z = 5$: $\left(\frac{5}{21}\right) = \left(\frac{5}{3}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{5}{7}\right) = (5^1 \bmod 3) \cdot (5^3 \bmod 7) = -1 \cdot -1 = 1$. Therefore $z = 5$ is ok

Goldwasser-Micali

Alice wants to encrypt $x = 10110$ for Bob

she chooses randomly $r_1 = 4$, $r_2 = 8$, $r_3 = 13$, $r_4 = 5$ and $r_5 = 4$

She computes:

$$y_1 = 5 \cdot 4^2 = 80 = 17 \pmod{21}$$

$$y_2 = 8^2 = 1 \pmod{21}$$

$$y_3 = 5 \cdot 13^2 = 845 = 5 \pmod{21}$$

$$y_4 = 5 \cdot 5^2 = 125 = 20 \pmod{21}$$

$$y_5 = 4^2 = 16 \pmod{21}$$

The cipher text is $y = (17, 1, 5, 20, 16)$.

Goldwasser-Micali

To decrypt $y = (17, 1, 5, 20, 16)$ Bob computes the following Legendre symbols:

$$\left(\frac{y_1}{p}\right) = \left(\frac{17}{7}\right) = 17^3 = 4913 = -1 \pmod{7} \neq 1 \rightarrow x_1 = 1$$

$$\left(\frac{y_2}{p}\right) = \left(\frac{1}{7}\right) = 1^3 = 1 \pmod{7} \rightarrow x_2 = 0$$

$$\left(\frac{y_3}{p}\right) = \left(\frac{5}{7}\right) = 5^3 = 125 = -1 \pmod{7} \neq 1 \rightarrow x_3 = 1$$

$$\left(\frac{y_4}{p}\right) = \left(\frac{20}{7}\right) = 20^3 = 8000 = -1 \pmod{7} \neq 1 \rightarrow x_4 = 1$$

$$\left(\frac{y_5}{p}\right) = \left(\frac{16}{7}\right) = 16^3 = 4096 = 1 \pmod{7} \rightarrow x_5 = 0$$

Bob retrieves $x = 10110$

Algorithm Extended Euclidean algorithm

INPUT: two non-negative integers a and b with $a \geq b$.

OUTPUT: $d = \gcd(a, b)$ and integers x, y satisfying $ax + by = d$.

1. If $b = 0$ then set $d \leftarrow a$, $x \leftarrow 1$, $y \leftarrow 0$, and return(d, x, y).
 2. Set $x_2 \leftarrow 1$, $x_1 \leftarrow 0$, $y_2 \leftarrow 0$, $y_1 \leftarrow 1$.
 3. While $b > 0$ do the following:
 - 3.1 $q \leftarrow \lfloor a/b \rfloor$, $r \leftarrow a - qb$, $x \leftarrow x_2 - qx_1$, $y \leftarrow y_2 - qy_1$.
 - 3.2 $a \leftarrow b$, $b \leftarrow r$, $x_2 \leftarrow x_1$, $x_1 \leftarrow x$, $y_2 \leftarrow y_1$, and $y_1 \leftarrow y$.
 4. Set $d \leftarrow a$, $x \leftarrow x_2$, $y \leftarrow y_2$, and return(d, x, y).
-

Algorithm Computing multiplicative inverses in \mathbb{Z}_n

INPUT: $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.

OUTPUT: $a^{-1} \bmod n$, provided that it exists.

1. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm (Algorithm 2.107) to find integers x and y such that $ax + ny = d$, where $d = \gcd(a, n)$.
 2. If $d > 1$, then $a^{-1} \bmod n$ does not exist. Otherwise, return(x).
-

Algorithm Repeated square-and-multiply algorithm for exponentiation in \mathbb{Z}_n

INPUT: $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, and integer $0 \leq k < n$ whose binary representation is $k = \sum_{i=0}^t k_i 2^i$.

OUTPUT: $a^k \bmod n$.

1. Set $b \leftarrow 1$. If $k = 0$ then return(b).
 2. Set $A \leftarrow a$.
 3. If $k_0 = 1$ then set $b \leftarrow a$.
 4. For i from 1 to t do the following:
 - 4.1 Set $A \leftarrow A^2 \bmod n$.
 - 4.2 If $k_i = 1$ then set $b \leftarrow A \cdot b \bmod n$.
 5. Return(b).
-

Algorithm Finding square roots modulo a prime p

INPUT: an odd prime p and an integer a , $1 \leq a \leq p - 1$.

OUTPUT: the two square roots of a modulo p , provided a is a quadratic residue modulo p .

1. Compute the Legendre symbol $\left(\frac{a}{p}\right)$ using Algorithm 2.149. If $\left(\frac{a}{p}\right) = -1$ then return(a does not have a square root modulo p) and terminate.
 2. Select integers b , $1 \leq b \leq p - 1$, at random until one is found with $\left(\frac{b}{p}\right) = -1$. (b is a quadratic non-residue modulo p .)
 3. By repeated division by 2, write $p - 1 = 2^s t$, where t is odd.
 4. Compute $a^{-1} \bmod p$ by the extended Euclidean algorithm (Algorithm 2.142).
 5. Set $c \leftarrow b^t \bmod p$ and $r \leftarrow a^{(t+1)/2} \bmod p$ (Algorithm 2.143).
 6. For i from 1 to $s - 1$ do the following:
 - 6.1 Compute $d = (r^2 \cdot a^{-1})^{2^{s-i-1}} \bmod p$.
 - 6.2 If $d \equiv -1 \pmod{p}$ then set $r \leftarrow r \cdot c \bmod p$.
 - 6.3 Set $c \leftarrow c^2 \bmod p$.
 7. Return($r, -r$).
-

Algorithm Finding square roots modulo n given its prime factors p and q

INPUT: an integer n , its prime factors p and q , and $a \in Q_n$.

OUTPUT: the four square roots of a modulo n .

1. Use Algorithm 3.39 (or Algorithm 3.36 or 3.37, if applicable) to find the two square roots r and $-r$ of a modulo p .
 2. Use Algorithm 3.39 (or Algorithm 3.36 or 3.37, if applicable) to find the two square roots s and $-s$ of a modulo q .
 3. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm (Algorithm 2.107) to find integers c and d such that $cp + dq = 1$.
 4. Set $x \leftarrow (rdq + scp) \bmod n$ and $y \leftarrow (rdq - scp) \bmod n$.
 5. Return($\pm x \bmod n, \pm y \bmod n$).
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